The effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and information-sharing intentions by Moser, KS et al.
 Reward interdependence and cooperation intentions 1 
Running head:  Reward interdependence and cooperation intentions 
The effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and 
information-sharing intentions 
 
 
 
Karin S. Moser & Katrin Wodzicki 
 
University of Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
In press, Swiss Journal of Psychology
 Reward interdependence and cooperation intentions 2 
Abstract 
Incentives are central to reinforce behaviour. In the context of group work, it is important to 
distinguish between individual and collective incentives as rewards. High reward 
interdependence should constitute an incentive for cooperation among group members (e.g. 
collective vs. individual financial rewards), but experimental studies provide no support for this 
assumption, while some field studies found an increase in information exchange and team 
productivity. In two experimental studies presented here (N1=46, N2=28), high reward 
interdependence resulted in a higher willingness to share information with and to help other 
group members, stronger responses to poor quality of others’ work, higher preference for joint 
layout, and less withdrawal as response to reluctant engagement of others. The findings suggest 
that high reward interdependence can indeed act as an incentive for cooperative behaviour and 
information sharing, also in an experimental setting.  
 
Key words: Reward interdependence, cooperation, helping behaviour, information sharing, 
group work 
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The effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and 
information sharing intentions 
In the work context, the importance of team work has been increasing continuously over the past 
years. At the same time, information and knowledge have become primary resources and central 
criteria for the successful functioning of organizations in both, the private and public sector 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Both developments led to increasing demands on group work, as 
organizations realized that cooperative behaviour and information sharing among organizational 
members need to be enhanced and supported to be successful (Lawler, 2000; Rynes, Gerhart, & 
Parks, 2005; Thompson, Levine, & Messick, 1999). Thus, there is a great interest in what 
facilitates effective team work and information sharing (Eby & Dobbins, 1997; Jones & Jordan, 
1998; Ng & Van Dyne, 2005). Incentives are central to reinforce behaviour (Honeywell-Johnson 
& Dickinson, 1999). In the context of group work, the distinction between individual and 
collective incentives is important, which is the reason why reward interdependence has drawn 
the attention of researchers interested in group effectiveness. It is generally assumed that high 
reward interdependence constitutes an incentive for cooperation among group members. 
Interestingly, experimental studies on the effect of reward interdependence provide no support 
for this assumption while in some field studies reward interdependence was associated with an 
increase in information exchange, team productivity and other related variables. It is therefore 
the aim of the studies presented here to further our understanding of the causal relation between 
reward interdependence and the motivation to cooperate and share information in an 
experimental setting.  
Overview of research 
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Empirical research has identified different types of interdependence as being important 
for cooperation and information sharing. Wageman (2001) has differentiated between two types 
of structural interdependence, namely task and outcome interdependence. Task interdependence 
refers to the necessity to work together to complete the task, whereas outcome interdependence 
is characterised by the degree to which outcomes of the work are dependent on the performance 
of all group members. One important type of outcome interdependence that can be used to 
characterize teams is reward interdependence. Reward interdependence is defined by Wageman 
(2001) as the extent to which the reward of an individual group member depends on the 
performance of other group members. It is assumed that high reward interdependence constitutes 
an incentive for cooperation and helping behaviour among group members (Wageman & Baker, 
1997). Fan and Gruenfeld (1998) argued that high reward interdependence creates a sense of 
common fate and hence, the motivation to cooperate should be increased. 
Several researchers have investigated the effects of different types of rewards on 
cooperation and effectiveness of groups (for reviews see Miller & Hamblin, 1963; Johnson, 
Maruyama, Johnson, & Skon, 1981; Cotton & Cook, 1982; DeMatteo, Eby, & Sundstrom, 1998; 
Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005). In one of the most 
recent reviews on team-based rewards, DeMatteo, Eby, and Sundstrom (1998) examined 
laboratory and field studies on reward interdependence that were conducted between 1985 and 
1997. In summary, these studies provided mixed support for the effectiveness of team-based 
rewards. In the experimental research included in the review, no direct effect of reward 
interdependence on performance and cooperation was found, as the effect of reward 
interdependence was always moderated by task interdependence. However, the reviewed field 
studies provided mixed support for the effectiveness of reward interdependence. Some studies 
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reported indeed direct effects of reward interdependence on information exchange, productivity 
and perception of group effectiveness (Barnard & Rush, 1995; Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 
1993; Campion, Papper, & Medsker, 1996), while others found no effects (Magjuka & Baldwin, 
1991; Wageman, 1995).  
Field studies on reward interdependence 
Some of the field studies included in the review above (DeMatteo et al., 1998) considered 
both reward and task interdependence and their effects on cooperation and effectiveness of work 
groups in organizations. For example, Campion et al. (1993) examined the effect of reward 
interdependence and found positive correlations with employee satisfaction, communication, and 
cooperation in teams. In a second Study, Campion et al. (1996) also found positive correlations 
of reward interdependence with employee and manager judgements of team effectiveness, in 
addition to correlations with team communication and cooperation. Although task 
interdependence was also examined and had positive effects on team effectiveness, the authors 
did not consider a possible interaction with reward interdependence. Only Wageman (1995) 
considered the interaction between reward and task interdependence in a field Study setting. In 
her Study, she categorized existing teams at a large U.S. corporation according to task types 
depending on whether they were working on group, hybrid, or individual tasks. Reward 
interdependence was then manipulated in the field for all teams through group, individual, and 
hybrid rewards. However, Wageman did not find an interaction between reward and task 
interdependence. A closer look at the data showed that only in teams with either hybrid tasks or 
hybrid rewards or with a combination of both, a negative effect on performance was found. 
Consequently, only main effects of reward and task interdependence on group performance were 
significant but not the interaction between them. Both, group and individual rewards, as well as 
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group and individual tasks in any combination resulted in a better performance than conditions 
with either hybrid rewards or hybrid tasks or both. Additionally, Wagemann (1995) found main 
effects for task interdependence on cooperation and quality of the group process, but not for 
reward interdependence. 
In a more recent Study, Hertel, Konradt, & Orlikowski (2004) investigated the effect of 
different types of interdependence on the effectiveness of virtual teams. They found a significant 
correlation between team-based rewards and team effectiveness rated by both, managers and 
team members, whereas task interdependence was only marginally correlated with team 
effectiveness. An effect of task interdependence could only be shown for new teams. Linear 
regression analysis revealed significant effects for team-based rewards and quality of goal 
setting, whereas task interdependence was not predictive. A possible interaction between reward 
and task interdependence was not tested in this Study. 
Most of the field studies did not consider the possible interaction between reward and 
task interdependence on effectiveness even if both types of interdependence were studied. 
However, it is of interest whether or not the positive effect of reward interdependence will 
disappear if the interaction between task and reward interdependence is taken into account, 
which has been a central focus in experimental research. 
Experimental research on reward interdependence 
Two recent experimental studies (Wageman & Baker, 1997; Allen, Sargent, & Bradley, 
2003) examined the interaction of reward and task interdependence. Both studies conducted a 
group copy editing activity. Task interdependence was manipulated by the extent to which the 
group members could contribute some unique knowledge to the task completion of the other 
group members. Reward interdependence differed in the proportion of total monetary reward, 
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which depended on the performance of others. Wageman and Baker (1997) manipulated three 
different levels of task and reward interdependence, Allen et al. (2003) realized only two levels. 
Wageman and Baker (1997) found an interaction between task and reward interdependence on 
group performance. But contrary to their hypothesis, reward interdependence did not influence 
performance and cooperative behaviour in the group independently of task interdependence. 
These findings were also confirmed in the Study by Allen et al. (2003). Equally, Allen et al. 
(2003) found that helping behaviour or effort was not influenced by reward interdependence or 
its interaction with task interdependence. In addition, they found no interactive effect of task and 
reward interdependence on performance. In both experimental studies, high task interdependence 
had a positive effect on cooperation and helping behaviour, suggesting that task interdependence 
is indeed the dominant predictor of cooperation and helping behaviour in groups. 
However, as Allen et al. (2003) pointed out themselves, group performance in the highly 
interdependent task condition differed significantly from performance in the low interdependent 
task condition. High interdependent tasks required considerable interaction among group 
members to perform well. Also, participants experienced the high interdependence tasks as more 
complex. Therefore, the low and high task interdependence conditions were not really 
comparable with respect to task difficulty. Additionally, we think that the findings in both studies 
and their limited support for the effects of reward interdependence might also be explained by 
the manipulation of task interdependence. In the high task interdependence condition, high 
rewards depended directly on cooperative behaviour and information sharing among group 
members in both studies, because individuals could only perform well and receive the financial 
reward if they shared their unique knowledge. The manipulation therefore caused a ceiling effect 
on the dependent variables. In contrast, in the low task interdependence condition, individual 
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group members had no possibility to influence the performance of the other group members 
because of the different types of knowledge participants were trained in. Thus, there was no 
motivation to cooperate and share knowledge to perform well and receive a higher reward, and 
thus high reward interdependence could not act as an additional incentive for cooperation and 
sharing of knowledge among the group members. As a result of the manipulation of task and 
reward interdependence, both constructs were not completely independent of one another. 
Because of these restrictions in current research, it seemed desirable to examine the independent 
effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and sharing behaviour in an experimental 
design. 
Aims of the presented research 
In contrast to former studies, we wanted to investigate the influence of reward 
interdependence in a task context where reward interdependence could actually function as an 
additional incentive for cooperation and information sharing. We therefore focused on a task 
with low to moderate task interdependence with the possibility of individual task completion 
without any cooperation at all. To this aim, we designed an experimental scenario with the task 
context of a small seminar group of university students. In the student work groups, group 
members can share different information and cooperate in different ways (e.g. exchange of 
relevant literature, excerpts of articles, work techniques as well as assistance with individual 
problems of group members). In the designed scenario, the group members are given the choice 
of three different ways to go about the task: Individually, collectively or in a combination of 
both. In the described scenario, cooperation vs. non-cooperation has different costs and benefits. 
On the one hand, performance of the individual group member can be promoted by cooperation 
and sharing of information. On the other hand, cooperation also needs additional resources such 
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as time and effort – resources that can then not be used for the individual mastery of the task. 
Consequently, rewards in our scenario did not depend on task interdependence, and reward 
interdependence could actually function as an additional incentive for cooperation and 
information sharing. Because individual contributions to the group work were highly visible (see 
detailed description of scenario below), we did not expect social loafing to occur. It was 
therefore hypothesized that: 
H1: Individuals in the high reward interdependence condition show more cooperative and 
helping behaviour than individuals in the low reward interdependence condition, such as giving 
assistance to other group members, and engaging in collective effort like group meetings etc. 
H2: Individuals in the high reward interdependence condition show more information 
sharing behaviour than individuals in the low reward interdependence condition, such as 
exchange of excerpts of articles and passing on of relevant literature to others etc. 
Additionally, strong concerns about the work quality of other group members are also an 
indicator for high reward interdependence. It was thus hypothesized that: 
H3: Individuals in the high reward interdependence condition show a higher concern 
about the work quality of other group members than individuals in the low reward 
interdependence condition. 
We also expected that in the high reward interdependence condition, commitment to the 
group and perceived group identity should be increased. We therefore hypothesized that 
presentation as a group toward non-group members should more important than in the low 
reward interdependence condition. 
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H4: Individuals in the high reward interdependence condition have a stronger preference 
for a joint presentation of the whole group than individuals in the low reward interdependence 
condition, such as investing time in a joint layout for the presentation of the group work. 
High reward interdependence should also be associated with greater concerns about 
group performance. If problems arise and other group members are not equally committed to the 
task, individuals in the high reward interdependence condition should not withdraw from the 
group, because they have a strong individual interest in solving the problem and ensuring group 
performance.  
H5: Individuals in the low reward interdependence condition show a greater readiness to 
withdraw from the group work than individuals in the high reward interdependence condition, if 
other group members are not equally committed to the task. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-six undergraduate and graduate students of the University of Zurich participated in 
the first Study (39 women, 7 men, age: M = 27.52, SD = 7.08). Forty-two participants studied 
psychology as main subject. The other four studied journalism, political science, sociology und 
philosophy as main subject. On average they studied since 4.83 semesters (SD = 3.40, range 
from 2 to 16 semesters). Participants received credit points or took part in a lottery of a book 
token amounting to 75 Euro. 
Research Design 
The research design of Study 1 is a one-factorial between-group design with three factor 
levels (low, mixed, and high reward interdependence). To manipulate reward interdependence, 
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three different versions of the student work group-scenario were realized. All three versions of 
the scenario described the situation of a seminar work group consisting of three university 
students. The students had to write a term paper that was based on a literature research. Each 
student had to prepare one part of the paper and give a presentation about his/her part before the 
whole seminar class. Within the university context, relevant rewards are high marks. The reward 
in our scenario therefore consisted of high marks and was reinforced by a conjunction with an 
interesting seminar in the following semester, which could only be attended if a high mark for 
both, the term paper and presentation was achieved. In addition, the mark for the term paper was 
part of the final grade for graduation. 
The three scenario versions differed only in the reward interdependence realized by the 
grading. In the low reward interdependence condition, each student received an individual mark 
for his/her part of the term paper and his/her part of the presentation. In the mixed reward 
interdependence condition, each student received an individual mark for his/her part of the term 
paper and a collective mark for the whole presentation of the group before the seminar class – 
the average of both marks resulted in the final individual mark. In the high reward 
interdependence condition, the students received a collective mark for the entire group, which 
was also the individual mark for the term paper and the presentation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three experimental conditions, with 16 participants in the low reward 
interdependence condition and 15 in the mixed and high reward interdependence conditions 
respectively. 
Measures 
After participants read one of the three scenario versions, they had to answer a short 
questionnaire about their preference for a joint vs. individual literature research, their response to 
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poor quality of another group members’ work, their willingness to share an article with another 
group member and their reaction to reluctant engagement of the other group members. These 
questions were rated on a six-point scale (from 1 = very unlikely to 6 = very likely). In addition, 
we asked them about their preference for a joint layout of the presentation. This question were 
rated on a four-point scale (from 1 = individual layout, 2 = tendence to individual layout, 3 = 
tendence to joint layout, 4 = joint layout), because a six-point-scale made no sense.  
As a control variable, we also asked the participants about their general attitude towards 
cooperation and information sharing by including four items of the reciprocity scale of the 
Knowledge Cooperation Inventory (Moser, 2002), rated on a four-point scale (from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 4 = strongly agree). A sample item is “We can benefit from our knowledge and our 
experiences, if we share with each other“ (α = .79). To account for possible effects of the uneven 
sex distribution in our sample, we additionally used sex as a covariate in our analyses. Inter-
correlations between measures are represented in Table 1. 
___________________ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
___________________ 
Manipulation check measures  
To check for the participants’ perception of reward and task interdependence in the 
scenario, we included one four-item scale and two three-item scales following Campion et al. 
(1993), rated on a four-point scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The four-
item scale assessed task interdependence (e.g. “I can write my part of the term paper and prepare 
the corresponding presentation without exchange and cooperation with the other group 
members.”, reverse-scored; α = .77). The manipulation check of perceived reward 
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interdependence distinguished between reward interdependence concerning the term paper and 
reward interdependence concerning the presentation. Both types of reward interdependence were 
assessed with the same three items (e.g. “My mark for the term paper (the presentation, 
respectively) depends primarily on the appraisal of the whole group”), in both cases one item had 
to be excluded because of its poor item-total correlation (remaining two item scales: term paper: 
r = .69; presentation: r = .79).  
Procedure 
Participants were seated in separate cubicles. The Study was labelled as a Study about 
„Work strategies during university education”. The scenario was introduced by the experimenter 
and the participants were requested to take some time to put themselves into the described 
situation und then to proceed with answering the questions. The participants needed about twenty 
minutes to read the scenario carefully and answer questions and were debriefed afterwards. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
To check the manipulation of reward interdependence, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted for both, the reward interdependence for the term paper and the reward 
interdependence for the presentation separately. For the term paper, the reward interdependence 
manipulation was successful, F(2, 43) = 10.52, p < .01, η2 = .33. As expected, the perceived 
reward interdependence for the term paper was higher under the condition of high reward 
interdependence (Mhigh = 3.50, SDhigh = .57) than for the conditions of low and mixed reward 
interdependence (Mmixed = 2.53, SDmixed = .69; Mlow = 2.72, SDlow = .58). Only in the high reward 
interdependence condition, the individual mark for the term paper depended on the performance 
of the other group members and their parts of the term paper. 
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For the presentation, the manipulation of reward interdependence manipulation was also 
successful, F(2, 43) = 8.10, p < .01, η2 = .27. As expected, the perceived reward interdependence 
for the presentation was higher for mixed and high reward interdependence (Mhigh = 3.40, SDhigh 
= .54; Mmixed = 3.30, SDmixed = .68) than for low reward interdependence (Mlow = 2.63, SDlow = 
.53). In the condition of high reward interdependence as well as in the condition of mixed reward 
interdependence, the group received a collective mark for the presentation and thus participant’s 
marks depended on each other’s performance at the presentation. 
As expected, the check for differences of perceived task interdependence between the 
three experimental conditions was not significant, F(2, 43) = 1.03, p = .37.  
Multivariate analysis of variance 
Given the modest sample size and to estimate the practical significance of the results 
without disregarding results simply because we did not have enough power to detect meaningful 
differences, we examined adjusted critical F values and adjusted alpha levels using a procedure 
called compromise power analysis (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). Compromise power 
analysis provides critical F values and alpha levels to help making decisions about which effects 
are meaningfully and statistically significant and interpretable, especially with moderate to small 
sample sizes. For the post hoc compromise power analysis we used an alpha-beta-ratio of equal 
to 1 as recommended by Erdfelder and his colleagues. Compromise power analysis showed for 
an assumed medium effect size of f = .25 a critical F value of F(2, 42) = 1.19 with a critical alpha 
= .32 and a power = .68. 
To test the effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and information sharing, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with reward interdependence as 
independent variables and the preference for a joint literature research, the response to poor 
 Reward interdependence and cooperation intentions 15 
quality of another group members’ work, the willingness to share an article with another group 
member, the preference for a joint layout of the presentation and the reaction to reluctant 
engagement of the other group members as dependent variables (figure 1). The MANOVA 
showed an overall effect of reward interdependence on all dependent variables, Wilks’ λ = .58, 
F(10, 76) = 2.39, p = .02, η2 = 24.  
___________________ 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
___________________ 
Results of univariate tests showed confirmation of all hypotheses but one. Hypothesis 1 
predicted that the willingness to show cooperative and helping behaviour is stronger under high 
reward interdependence then under low reward interdependence. The univariate analysis showed 
a significant effect of reward interdependence on the preference for a joint literature research, 
F(2, 42) = 2.37, p = .11, η2 = .10. Participants in the high reward and mixed reward conditions 
showed a greater preference for a joint literature research than participants in the low reward 
condition. Hypothesis 2 could not be supported, reward interdependence was not related to the 
willingness to pass on an article to another group member, F(2, 42) = .73, p = .49. As predicted 
in hypothesis 3, reward interdependence influenced participants’ response to poor quality of 
other group members’ work, F(2, 42) = 3.30, p = .05, η2 = .14. Participants in the conditions of 
high and mixed reward interdependence reported a greater willingness to intervene in case of 
poor work of another group member than participants in the low reward interdependence 
condition. As assumed in hypothesis 4, preference for a joint layout was significantly stronger 
for participants with high and mixed reward interdependence, F(2, 42) = 5.02, p = .01, η2 = .19, 
than participants in the low reward interdependence condition. Hypothesis 5 predicted that there 
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would be greater readiness to withdraw from the group work under low reward interdependence 
than under high and mixed reward interdependence, if other group members had reservations 
about their commitment. As expected, withdrawal decreased under high and mixed reward 
interdependence, if other team members were reluctant to commit themselves, F(2, 42) = 1.47, p 
= .24, η2 = .07.  
Controls 
Overall, we found a very favourable attitude towards information sharing and strong 
intentions to cooperate with other group members (M = 3.60, SD = .45; 4-point scale), with 
attitude towards information sharing as a significant covariate, Wilks’ λ = .68, F(5, 37) = 3.49, p 
= .01, η2 = .32. This might also explain the readiness to pass on articles to other group members, 
regardless of reward interdependence (see above, hypothesis 2). However, taking into account 
attitude towards information sharing as a covariate, the multivariate test still revealed a 
significant effect of the experimental conditions (Wilks’ λ = .57, F(10, 74) = 2.40, p = .02, η2 = 
.25).  
Because of the uneven sex distribution of the sample in Study 1, sex was tested as a 
covariate, but was not significant, Wilks’ λ = .79, F(5, 37) = 2.01, p = .10, η2 = .21. Even when 
taking into account sex as covariate, the multivariate test still revealed a significant effect of the 
experimental conditions, Wilks’ λ = .57, F(10, 74) = 2.41, p = .02, η2 = .25.  
Discussion 
In contrast to previous experimental research (Wageman & Baker, 1997, Allen et al., 
2003), was possible to manipulate reward interdependence independently of task 
interdependence and reward interdependence was shown to have direct effects on important 
aspects of cooperation and information sharing when task interdependence was low to moderate. 
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As expected, participants showed greater concerns for the work of other group members, a 
stronger preference for joint literature research and for a joint presentation of the whole group 
towards non-group members, and a lower readiness to withdraw from the group work under the 
condition of high and mixed reward interdependence, and thus all hypotheses except hypothesis 
2 were confirmed. The missing support for hypothesis 2 can perhaps be explained by the 
extremely positive attitude towards cooperation in the student sample as indicated by the control 
variable measuring general attitude towards cooperation. Within the Study context, cooperation 
is the rule and usually to the advantage of everybody. Also, there is seldom a reason for direct 
competition between students. Thus the advantages of cooperation generally outweigh the risks 
of being exploited by other students.  
Because of the very positive perception of cooperation in the first study, we conducted a 
second study with the aim to intensify the conflict between the individual interest to perform 
well and the collective goal to cooperate and help each other to promote group performance. 
Therefore, we revised the scenario description to further strengthen the dilemma between 
individual and collective costs and benefits. Furthermore, we decided to manipulate only low and 
high reward interdependence in Study 2 because of the little difference between the mixed and 
high reward interdependence conditions in Study 1. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-eight undergraduates and graduate students of the University of Zurich took part 
in the second study. All participants studied education science as main subject and participated in 
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the same methodology course (24 women, 4 men; age: M = 26.71, SD = 6.63). On average, they 
studied for 4.18 semesters (SD = 3.84, range from 2 to 20).  
Research design 
The research design of Study 2 was a one-factorial between-groups design. In contrast to 
Study 1, we realized only two factor levels (low and high reward interdependence). Thus, we 
used only two different versions of the scenario. As in Study 1, the scenario described the 
situation of a seminar work group of three students. To further intensify the conflict between the 
individual goal to reach a high mark and be able to attend the seminar in the following semester, 
and the collective goal to cooperate and share information with others, we included a further 
limited access to the seminar in the following semester. In addition, we adapted some of the 
items and included one additional item (see measures below).  
As in Study 1, the two scenario versions differed only in the degree of reward 
interdependence realized through the grading. In the low reward interdependence condition, an 
individual mark was given for both the individual part of the term paper and the presentation. In 
the high reward interdependence condition, the collective mark was also the individual mark. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions, with 14 
participants in each condition.  
Measures 
After the scenario description, the participants had to answer the same questionnaire as in 
Study 1. To intensify dilemma perception, three items of the questionnaire used in Study 1 were 
adapted slightly (preference for joint literature research, willingness to share an article with 
another group, and reaction to reluctant engagement of other group members). One new item was 
included in Study 2, concerning the willingness to help another group member with problems in 
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literature research. All items were rated on a six-point scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree) and only the item about a joint layout was rated on a four-point scale because a 
six-point-scale made no sense (from 1 = individual layout, 2 = tendency to individual layout, 3 = 
tendency to joint layout, 4 = joint layout).  
As in Study 1, we included four items to measure the general attitude towards 
cooperation and information sharing as control variable (from the reciprocity scale of the 
Knowledge Cooperation Inventory, Moser, 2002; α = .71), with items rated on a four-point scale 
(from 1 = strong disagree to 4 = strong agree). To account for possible effects of the uneven sex 
distribution in our second sample, we additionally used sex as a covariate in our analyses. Inter-
correlations between measures are represented in Table 1. 
Manipulation check measures 
As in Study 1, we checked for the participants’ perception of reward and task 
interdependence. Task interdependence was assessed by the same four-item scale (following 
Campion, Medsker, and Higgs, 1993; α = .62). Reward interdependence was measured by the 
same three items as in Study 1 (following Campion, Medsker, and Higgs, 1993; α = .71), but 
without a differentiation between the term paper and the presentation, because we excluded the 
mixed reward interdependence condition, and with a revised third item because of its poor item-
total correlation in Study 1. Participants responded on four-point scale (from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 4 = strongly agree). 
Procedure 
The experiment was part of a course on empirical research methods at the institute of 
education science. All participants took part in the study at the same time in the class room. The 
title of the study was the same as in Study 1. At the beginning, participants were asked to read 
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the scenario carefully and to answer the questionnaire afterwards. Average time for completion 
was about twenty minutes with debriefing afterwards. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
To check for the efficacy of the reward interdependence manipulation, we conducted an 
ANOVA on the perceived reward interdependence. The ANOVA revealed the expected 
significant effect, F(1, 26) = 5.3, p = .03, η2 = 17. Participants in the high reward 
interdependence condition perceived greater reward interdependence (Mhigh = 3.33, SDhigh = .54) 
than participants in the low reward interdependence condition (Mlow = 2.88, SDlow = .50).  We 
further checked for differences in the perceived task interdependence. The ANOVA revealed no 
significant difference between the two conditions as expected, F(1, 26) = .69, p = .42.  
Multivariate analysis of variance 
As in Study 1, we used compromise power analysis to provide critical F values and alpha 
levels to help making decisions about which effects are meaningfully and statistically significant 
and interpretable, especially with moderate to small sample sizes. Our post hoc compromise 
power analysis was computed setting the alpha-beta-ratio equal to 1 and showed for an assumed 
medium effect size of f = .25 a critical F value of F(1, 26) = 0.93 with a critical alpha = .34 and a 
power = .66. 
To test the effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and information sharing, 
again a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with reward 
interdependence as independent variables and the preference for a joint literature research, the 
willingness to help with another group member regarding literature research, the response to 
poor quality of another group members’ work, the willingness to share an article with another 
 Reward interdependence and cooperation intentions 21 
group member, the preference for a joint layout of the presentation and the reaction to reluctant 
engagement of the other group members as dependent variables (figure 2). The MANOVA 
showed an overall significant effect of reward interdependence on all dependent variables, 
Wilks’ λ = .40, F(6, 19) = 4.82, p = .01, η2 = .60.  
___________________ 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
___________________ 
Results of univariate test showed confirmation of all hypotheses. As predicted in 
hypothesis 1, the willingness to help other group members with problems regarding literature 
research is significantly higher under high reward interdependence than under low reward 
interdependence, F(1, 24) = 6.10, p = .02, η2 = .20. Preference for a joint literature research also 
showed a significant effect of reward interdependence when using the adjusted critical alpha 
level, F(1, 24) = 1.43, p = .24, η2 = .06, however the differences in means was contrary to our 
expectations. Thus, hypothesis 1 received only mixed support. Hypothesis 2 predicted that 
participants in the high reward interdependence condition would show a higher willingness to 
pass on an article to another group member than participants in the low reward interdependence 
condition, which could be confirmed, F(1, 24) = 3.28, p = .08, η2 = .12.  As expected in 
hypothesis 3, we also found a significant effect of reward interdependence on the readiness to 
respond to poor quality of other members’ work, F(1, 24) = 10.69, p < .01, η2 = .31. Equally, 
participants in the high reward interdependence condition had a stronger preference for a joint 
layout than participants in the low reward condition, F(1, 24) = 4.91, p = .04, η2 = .17, as 
proposed in hypothesis 4. Reaction to reluctant engagement of other group members yielded the 
predicted significant effect of reward interdependence, F(1, 24) = 3.77, p = .06, η2 = .14, with  
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greater readiness to withdraw from the group for participants in the low reward interdependence 
condition, if other group members had reservations about committing themselves (hypothesis 5).  
Controls 
As in Study 1, participants had a very positive attitude towards information sharing and 
showed very strong intentions to cooperate with other group members (M = 3.61, SD = .36), with 
attitude towards information sharing again as a significant covariate, Wilks’ λ = .50, F(6, 18) = 
2.97, p = .03, η2 = .50. However, even when taking into account attitude towards information 
sharing as covariate, the multivariate test still revealed a significant effect of the experimental 
conditions, Wilks’ λ = .39, F(6, 18) = 4.75, p = .01, η2 = .61.  
To account for a possible influence of the uneven sex distribution, sex was tested as a 
covariate. However, he multivariate test showed that sex was again not a significant covariate, 
Wilks’ λ = .83, F(6, 18) = .63, p = .71, η2 = .17, and the experimental conditions still had a 
significant effect, Wilks’ λ = .41, F(6, 18) = 4.35, p = .01, η2 = .59.  
Discussion 
As in Study 1, it was possible to manipulate reward interdependence independently of 
task interdependence and central aspects of cooperation and information sharing were influenced 
by the manipulation of reward interdependence. In contrast to Study 1, the goal to strengthen the 
dilemma perception was clearly achieved in Study 2 and all hypotheses could be confirmed. As 
expected under high reward interdependence, students showed more helping behaviour, higher 
willingness to pass on an article to another group member, higher concerns about the 
commitment to the group task of other group members, stronger preferences for a joint 
representation of the whole group, and a lower readiness to withdraw from the group in response 
to reluctant engagement of other group members than under low reward interdependence. In 
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contrast to Study 1, the willingness to pass on an article to another group member was 
significantly higher under high reward interdependence, and hypothesis two could therefore be 
confirmed. However, contrary to our expectations and unlike Study 1, preference for joint 
literature research was stronger under low reward interdependence than under high reward 
interdependence in Study 2. At the same time and in line with our hypothesis one, we found a 
stronger willingness to help another group member with problems regarding literature research 
under high reward interdependence. 
General discussion 
Incentives are central to reinforce behaviour. In the context of group work, it is important 
to distinguish between individual and collective incentives, a fact that has drawn the attention of 
researchers interested in group effectiveness. It is generally assumed that high reward 
interdependence constitutes an incentive for cooperation among group members, but to date, 
results of experimental studies provided no support for this assumption. Interestingly though, in 
some field studies reward interdependence was associated with an increase in information 
exchange, team productivity and other related variables. It was therefore the aim of this paper to 
examine the effect of reward interdependence on cooperation and information exchange in an 
experimental setting and to manipulate reward interdependence independently of task 
interdependence.  
Manipulation checks in both studies showed that it was indeed possible to manipulate 
reward interdependence independently of task interdependence. We developed a scenario of a 
seminar work group, manipulating reward interdependence by using different procedures for 
grading the term paper and presentation students had to work on. In the low reward 
interdependence condition, individual marks were given for each student for his or her part of the 
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paper and the presentation, in the high reward interdependence condition a collective mark was 
given to the entire seminar group as individual mark for both presentation and term paper. In a 
mixed condition only used in Study 1, a combination of high and low reward interdependence 
was used (individual mark for paper, collective mark for presentation). In both studies, we 
expected effects of reward interdependence on the willingness to do joint literature research, 
helping behaviour (passing on articles relevant to other student’s parts of the term paper), joint 
layout for presentation, concern about commitment to group task, and withdrawal if other group 
members were reluctant to commit themselves. In both studies, the participants showed an 
extremely positive attitude towards cooperation, even more so in the sample in Study 2 were 
most students knew each other personally. Although the general attitude towards cooperation 
was very positive, we found significant effects of reward interdependence on the willingness to 
do joint literature research, invest in a joint layout for presentation, and willingness to respond to 
poor quality of other group member’s work, and withdrawal if other group members were 
reluctant to engage in the group task. While Study 1 provided support for all but one hypothesis 
(sharing articles with other group members), it was possible to increase the dilemma perception 
of costs vs. benefits of group vs. individual work strategies in Study 2 by revising the scenario 
only slightly, and consequently all five hypotheses could be confirmed in Study 2, with the 
exception of a reverse effect of one indicator of hypothesis 1 (joint literature research).  
Limitations 
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the results presented here. 
First of all, we only investigated behaviour intentions and not actual cooperative behaviour with 
the scenarios developed for the two studies. While intention formation to cooperate is a 
prerequisite for actual cooperation, it is certainly necessary to conduct further experiments on 
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reward interdependence with behavioural data. Also, social desirability certainly has to be 
considered when subjects report behaviour intentions. Secondly, the student participants 
represent a population with a predominantly positive attitude towards cooperation and 
information sharing where cooperation usually is an advantage for everybody and the mutual 
benefits of cooperation outweigh the possible costs of cooperation such as exploitation. It would 
certainly be helpful for the understanding of reward interdependence if different samples with 
working subjects and scenarios closer to actual work situations could be used, where mixed-
motive situations and social dilemmas are more prevalent than in the student context. On the 
other hand it can also be argued that the student samples were actually a much harder test for the 
effects of reward interdependence, because participants had such a positive attitude and potential 
costs for cooperation are comparatively low in the student context.  
Theoretical implications 
On summary, we draw the conclusion that it is indeed possible to show positive effects of 
reward interdependence also in an experimental setting and provide further support for the 
effects of reward interdependence, so far only found in some field studies. In the current work 
situation, where team work and information sharing become increasingly important, e.g. in the 
context of knowledge management projects (Davenport & Prusak, 1998), incentives for 
cooperation and extra efforts in team work are highly relevant. As the two studies have shown, 
intentions to share information, to help others in case of problems and the willingness to put 
extra effort into team work and care about the quality of work are significantly increased under 
high reward interdependence. However, we think it is important to emphasize that this effect of 
reward interdependence is only found if cooperation is an option but not necessary to complete 
the task. This is only the case if task interdependence is low or moderate, and cooperation is 
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voluntary as a consequence. Under this condition, reward interdependence can act as an effective 
incentive to promote team cooperation and information sharing. In our opinion, former 
experimental studies found no effect of reward interdependence, because task interdependence 
was high and therefore prevented reward interdependence to act as an additional incentive. We 
consider the independent effects of reward interdependence to be important in further 
understanding the motivational basis of team cooperation and information sharing. We agree 
with Hertel et al. (2004) that task interdependence mainly acts as incentive in the first stages of 
team work when coordination processes are import and being implemented. In contrast, 
perceived reward interdependence stays important through all stages of team work. For further 
research on reward interdependence, we believe that mediating processes and effects on group 
performance should be considered, such as spontaneous goal setting, chosen group goal level, 
and commitment to team goals (Guthrie & Hollensbe, 2004), bringing together goal setting 
theory and current findings on group performance and information sharing. 
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Table 1 
Inter-correlations in Studies 1 (data in first row) and 2 (data in second row) 
 1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6 
Joint literature research (1a) - 
- 
      
Help with literature research (1b) - 
-.36+
- 
- 
     
Sharing an article with another 
group member (2) 
.01 
.02 
- 
.43* 
- 
- 
    
Response to poor quality (3) .05 
.02 
- 
.56** 
.06 
.61** 
- 
- 
   
Joint layout (4) .14 
-.11 
- 
.14 
.16 
.02 
.18 
-.09 
- 
- 
  
Withdrawal as response to 
reluctant engagement (5) 
.11 
.03 
- 
-.49** 
.05 
-.31 
-.24 
-.47* 
-.21 
-.12 
- 
- 
 
Attitude towards information 
sharing (6) 
-.02 
.45* 
- 
.20 
.08 
.16 
-.10 
.19 
.02 
-.04 
-.47** 
-.41* 
- 
- 
Reward interdependence (7) .26+ 
-.26 
- 
.40* 
-.11 
.33+
.28 
.55** 
.39** 
.45* 
-.19 
-.39* 
-.01 
.03 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
withdrawal as response to 
reluctant engagement (H5)
joint layout (H4)
response to poor quality (H3)
sharing article with 
another group member (H2)
joint literature research (H1a)
low reward interdependence mixed reward interdependence
high reward interdependence 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean rating differences in reward interdependence for Study 1 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. 
Joint layout: 4-point scale. All other scales: 6-point scale. 
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joint literature research (H1a)
help with literature research (H1b)
sharing an article with 
another group member (H2)
response to poor quality (H3)
joint layout (H4)
withdrawal as response 
to reluctant engagement (H5)
4 5 1 2 3 6
low reward interdependence high reward interdependence 
Figure 2. Mean rating differences in reward interdependence for Study 2 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. 
Joint layout: 4-point scale. All other items: 6-point scale 
 
 
